The Fallibility of Scientific Researchers

On the subject of expert-worship and the elevation of science above all else, we have this entry from Tyler Cowen’s Marginal Revolution blog:

[R]esearcher fallibility remains an undertreated topic.  It should be at the center of any approach to method or philosophy of science, rather than the abstract principles we are usually fed. In any case, [this] is from a new paper … [boldface added]:

We report the results of a forecasting experiment about a randomized controlled trial [RCT] that was conducted in the field. The experiment asks Ph.D. students, faculty, and policy practitioners to forecast (1) compliance rates for the RCT and (2) treatment effects of the intervention. The forecasting experiment randomizes the order of questions about compliance and treatment effects and the provision of information that a pilot experiment had been conducted which produced null results. Forecasters were excessively optimistic about treatment effects and unresponsive to item order as well as to information about a pilot. Those who declare themselves expert in the area relevant to the intervention are particularly resistant to new information that the treatment is ineffective. We interpret our results as suggesting that we should exercise caution when undertaking expert forecasting, since experts may have unrealistic expectations and may be inflexible in altering these even when provided new information.